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Irrigation, poverty and inequality in rural China∗
Qiuqiong Huang, David Dawe, Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang
and Jinxia Wang†
This paper examines the impact of irrigation on rural incomes, poverty and the income
distribution in rural China. The relationship between irrigation and income is examined
using descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. A simulation approach is used to
explore the impact of irrigation on poverty incidence. To uncover the effect of irrigation
on the income distribution, inequality is decomposed by source of income, by group
according to access to irrigation and by estimated income ﬂows as a result of speciﬁc
household characteristics. The results show that irrigation increases income and reduces
poverty and inequality.
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1. Introduction
Although China has made remarkable progress in increasing the standard of living in
its rural areas since the onset of economic reform, rural income growth has slowed in
recentyearsandthedistributionofincomehasdeteriorated(NybergandRozelle1999;
World Bank 2001). Based on the government’s poverty line, the incidence of poverty
declined from 30.7 to 3.4 per cent between 1978 and 2000 (Wang et al. 2002). Poverty
reduction stalled in the late 1980s and early 1990s, recovered in the mid-1990s, but
stalled again in the late 1990s (Ravallion and Chen 2004). Large discrepancies among
households within regions and among sets of households in different regions have
begun to appear. Rozelle (1996) shows that the interregional Gini ratio increased from
0.28 in the 1980s to 0.42 in the 1990s in rural China. Yang (2002) shows a similar rise
in interhousehold measures of inequality. This widening of income inequality slowed
the rate of China’s poverty reduction (World Bank 2001).
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As the expansion of the rural economy has driven a large part of China’s past
economic growth (Perkins 1994), the recent sluggish rural income expansion and in-
creasinginequalityhavebeguntocommandnationalattention.Toreaccelerategrowth,
there is almost certainly a role for aggressive new investment in rural China. However,
inaneraofmacroeconomicreformsandtightgovernmentbudgetconstraints,efﬁcient
use of scarce resources has become increasingly important. Hence, in determining in-
vestment priorities, China’s leaders need to understand which investments can best
spur rural growth and reduce poverty and inequality.
One type of investment that China’s leaders have traditionally relied on to increase
rural livelihoods is investment in irrigation. China’s success in achieving food self-
sufﬁciency took place in the 1960s and 1970s when China’s government made massive
investments in irrigation infrastructure, suggesting that irrigation played a key role
in rural development in the past. In 2000, government spending on irrigation (35
billion yuan) exceeded the annual budget targeted speciﬁcally at poverty reduction
(22.4 billion yuan) and was more than 10 times the spending on agricultural research
(3.4 billion yuan) (Huang and Hu 2001; Ministry of Water Resource 2001; National
Statistical Bureau of China (CNSB) 2001a).
Despite such large investments, literature that examines the impact of irrigation
on agricultural performance is mixed – both inside and outside of China. Often,
studies of agricultural production, productivity and income growth cannot identify
positive effects of irrigation investment. For example, Fan et al. (2000) illustrate that
government expenditures on irrigation have only a modest impact on agricultural
productiongrowthandevenlessonruralpovertyandinequality,evenafteraccounting
for trickle-down beneﬁts. Jin et al. (2002) cannot ﬁnd a link between irrigation and the
totalfactorproductivity(TFP)growthofanymajorgraincrop(rice,wheatormaize)in
China between 1981 and 1995. Outside China, Rosegrant and Evenson (1992) are also
unable to establish a positive link between irrigation investment and productivity in
India. Hossain (2000) is among the few studies that ﬁnd a positive impact of irrigation
onruralhouseholdincome,inthePhilippinesandBangladesh.However,thehousehold
survey-based analyses use small samples that are not nationally representative. To our
knowledge, no household study has been used to examine these questions in China.
Despite the increasing seriousness of China’s rural inequality problem, there has
been little theoretical or empirical effort to study the effect of irrigation investment on
inequality. Most studies of inequality in China do not examine the role of irrigation
(e.g.,Rozelle1996;KungandLee2001).Theabsenceofresearchmightbearesultofthe
complicated nature of the linkages between irrigation and inequality; irrigation almost
certainly leads to increased agricultural incomes (Rozelle 1996). However, irrigation
has often been associated with rural households that reside in relatively favourable
areas (David and Otsuka 1994). Hence, without an empirical study, it is impossible to
predict whether increasing irrigation will help lower inequality.
The overall goal of our present paper is to examine the impact of irrigation on
income, poverty and income distribution in rural China. To meet the overall goal, the
paper pursues three speciﬁc objectives. First, we examine the relationship between irri-
gation and income using both descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. Second,
we use a simulation approach to explore the impact of irrigation on the incidence of
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poverty. Finally, in order to uncover the effect of irrigation on income distribution, we
decompose inequality by source of income, by group according to access to irrigation
and by estimated income ﬂows as a result of speciﬁc household characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the ﬁrst section we introduce the
data and variables used for the analysis. The second section describes the relation-
ship between irrigation and income and presents the multivariate analysis of income
determinants. The third section simulates changes in poverty incidence as a result of
changes in irrigation status. Thereafter, we decompose income inequality using several
different approaches, and present conclusions of the study.
2. Data
Our data come from a randomly selected, almost nationally representative sample of
60 rural villages in six provinces (Hebei, Liaoning, Shanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, and
Sichuan) (henceforth, the 2000 China National Rural Survey or 2000 CNRS). To
accurately reﬂect varying income distributions within each province, we selected one
county at random from within each provincial income quintile. The survey team ran-
domly selected two villages within each county and used village rosters and our own
counts to randomly choose 20 households. The village rosters included citizens with
andwithoutresidencypermits(hukou).Thesurveyincludedatotalof1198households.
The questionnaire included a special block that collected plot-level information. We
asked whether a plot was irrigated and the area of the household’s irrigated land. The
block also recorded information on other plot-speciﬁc variables, such as the type of
crop grown on a plot, crop yield, the degree of land fragmentation (measured as the
numberofplotsperhousehold),theproportionofgoodqualityland(theproportionof
onehousehold’slandthatisratedas‘highquality’bythefarmer)andtheproportionof
land that was affected by a negative shock during the cropping year (e.g., drought or
ﬂooding).
The survey collected data on rural household income that can be disaggregated
into cropping, off-farm and other income sources. Cropping income includes proceeds
from crop sales less expenses. Proﬁts from processed crops (e.g., rice noodle) are also
included in this category. Off-farm income includes all income from businesses run by
households, wages from a household member’s off-farm job and migrant remittances.
Most of the households in the sample also had some other form of income, such as
earnings from livestock, rent earnings, asset sales and pensions. This source of income
is classiﬁed as ‘other’ in this study.
The household survey also gathered detailed information on other household char-
acteristics. We have information on household size, average age and level of education
of the household’s labour force, total land holdings and asset holdings. Finally, a num-
ber of village level variables for our sample were constructed using data from a village
leader questionnaire.
3. Irrigation and income
Comparedtoothercountries,theproportionofChina’scultivatedareathatisirrigated
is high. Our data show approximately 49 per cent of total cultivated land is irrigated.
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Table 1 Annual household income per capita and are of irrigated land per capita
Total household Cropping Off-farm Total
income income income land
Irrigated land No. per capita† per capita per capita per capita
per capita (ha) household (yuan) (yuan) (yuan) (ha)
1. China 1198‡ 2257 (100%)§ 460 (19%) 1462 (66%) 0.148
2. 0 (Non-irrigated) 186 1571 (100%) 211 (12%) 1120 (71%) 0.235
3. Between 0 and 0.067 554 2590 (100%) 296 (11%) 1914 (75%) 0.089
4. Between 0.067 and 0.2 378 1984 (100%) 654 (31%) 1005 (52%) 0.148
5. Above 0.2 80 2825 (100%) 1254 (43%) 1289 (46%) 0.407
Source of data: 2000 China National Rural Survey. †Other income is not reported here as it is not the
focus of this paper. ‡Total number of households is 1198 instead of 1200 because information on two
households is missing. §Shares of different income sources in total household income are reported in
parentheses.
Although this ﬁgure is somewhat higher than the estimate published by the CNSB
(2001b) in its yearbook (41 per cent), both our estimate and that of the CNSB are
higher than for most other nations. For example, the comparable statistic for India
is 33 per cent, for Brazil it is 1 per cent and for the USA it is 6 per cent (Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 2002).
Our data show that the amount of irrigated land per capita is strongly correlated
with annual cropping income (Table 1, column 3). Compared to households without
irrigated land (row 2), annual per capita cropping income is 40 per cent higher (296 vs
211) in households that have irrigated land holdings of up to 0.067 hectare per capita
(row 3). This is true despite the fact that the average household’s cultivated land per
capita is only 0.089 hectare in the households with irrigated land, less than half that
of households without irrigated land. Cropping income per capita continues to rise as
irrigated land per capita increases (rows 4 and 5).
Our data also show that as irrigated land per capita increases, cropping income
becomes a more important source of household income (Table 1, column 3 – see
ﬁgures in parentheses). For example, cropping income accounts for only 12 per cent of
totalincomeforhouseholdswithoutirrigatedland.Theshareofincomefromcropping
grows continuously as irrigated land per capita increases. For those with more than
0.2 hectare irrigated land per capita, cropping contributes to 43 per cent of total
household income.
Total income per capita, however, does not show the same monotonically increasing
relationship with irrigated land area as does per capita cropping income (Table 1,
column 2). Households with irrigated land between 0 and 0.067 hectares per capita
have a relatively high average annual income (2590 yuan per capita). By contrast, those
with irrigated land between 0.067 and 0.2 hectares per capita have total incomes that
reach, on average, only 1984 yuan per capita.
After examining column 2 of Table 1, we can draw one of two conclusions:
(i), irrigation is not a signiﬁcant factor in determining total income; or (ii), we are
only observing two-way correlations and the true relationship between irrigation and
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total income could be masked by correlation between other factors. In order to answer
the question of whether irrigation affects household income we need to hold other
factors constant by using multivariate analysis.
3.1 Multivariate analysis
We follow the standard approach in the published literature on permanent income
analysis (Paxson 1992; Datt 1998) and income inequality in rural China speciﬁcally
(Benjamin et al. 2000; Morduch and Sicular 2002). In these studies, the determinants
of income can be analysed by making income a function of a set of household and
village characteristics, including household irrigated area. Because household income
istreatedinthesamewayasﬁrmproﬁt,incomeshouldalso,theoretically,beafunction
of output and input prices and other factors.
Following this literature, our basic model is:
yhv = α + γ Dhv + Xhvβ + Pvθ + Zvδ + µv + εhv, (1)
where yhv denotes total income, cropping income, off-farm income or other income
(in per capita terms) for household h in village v. Xhv is a matrix of household charac-
teristics including household size, average age and education level of the household’s
labour force, degree of land fragmentation, proportion of good quality land and pro-
portion of land affected by negative shocks. Cultivated land per capita is included to
control for land as a ﬁxed input. We have also included several variables, household
agricultural assets, self-employed business assets, livestock assets and non-productive
assets (in per capita terms), to control for factors including household access to credit
markets or ability to adopt new technologies. The matrix Pv denotes the prices farm-
ers face within each village, including both variable input prices and output prices.
Zv denotes the observable village characteristics including a village’s topography, its
distance from the county seat, the number of phones per capita in the village and the
proportion of villagers that worked off-farm in 1990. Equation 1 also includes a term,
µv, which represents all other village ﬁxed effects that vary by village and are difﬁcult
to observe or measure (e.g., the economic environment of the village, certain climatic
and/oragronomicfactorsthataffectvillage-wideyieldsandprices,etc.).Afterholding
Xhv and Zv constant, γ can be interpreted as our parameter of interest, measuring the
effect of area of irrigated land per capita denoted by Dhv.
It should be noted that a linear speciﬁcation for the income equation is required to
decompose the inequality by estimated income ﬂows, one of the approaches we use in
the third part of the paper to analyse the impact of irrigation on rural income distribu-
tion in China. This approach enables us to use the village-level data on employment,
infrastructure and topography, increasing the degrees of freedom and allowing us to
estimate the importance of these village characteristics. However, it is possible that we
have omitted village-level variables that, although unobserved, may affect income and
be correlated with irrigation. One such variable is weather variation in the village. In
such a case, we could have an omitted variables problem and estimates of γ would be
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inconsistent.1 If this were the case, one solution is to include a set of 60 village dummy
variables that capture all of the observed and unobservable village effects. Casting the
problem in this way (i.e., the ﬁxed effects model), however, means that we cannot sep-
arate the effect of speciﬁc village characteristics (Zv and µv) from other village ﬁxed
effects because all are captured by the village dummy variables. In addition, as input
and output prices are almost surely the same within each village, the effect of prices on
income is also grouped with other village ﬁxed effects and cannot be separated out. If
we adopt this approach, the ﬁxed effects model that we estimate is:
yhv − ¯ yhv = γ(Dhv − ¯ Dhv) + (Xhv − ¯ Xhv)β + (εhv − ¯ εhv), (2)
where ¯ yhv, ¯ Dhv, ¯ Xhv and ¯ εhv are the averages of variables at the village level.
Alternative estimation methods are also used to inspect the robustness of our esti-
mate. In our basic model, we estimate Equation 2 using ordinary least squares (OLS)
with ﬁxed-effects. In our sample, some households do not have a particular source
of income (e.g., off-farm income). Other households have negative incomes because
they have suffered from a large shock. In both cases, household income may not
be perfectly observed and a censoring problem arises (only positive values are per-
fectly observed). Under such a circumstance, OLS estimators may be inconsistent and
other estimators may be needed. A widely used censored regression model, the Tobit
model, assumes the latent dependent variable y∗
hv is normally distributed, while in
practice income is usually assumed to be lognormal. Hence, we choose not to use a
Tobit model to estimate the determinants of income. Alternatively, we use another
type of estimator, Powell’s (1984) censored least absolute deviation (CLAD), which
estimates parameters by minimising the term,  |yhv − max(0,α + γDhv + Xhvβ +
Pvθ + Zvδ + µv)|. Because the medians are preserved by the transformation of the
data, the consistency of CLAD estimators does not require the knowledge of the error
term, nor is it assumed the distribution of the error term is homoskedastic. More-
over, the outliers in observed incomes are given a much smaller weight. To inspect the
robustness of our OLS estimator, we use OLS without any ﬁxed effects to estimate
Equation 1 and OLS with the ﬁxed effects at the county level and CLAD to estimate
Equation 2.
1 We do not worry about the problem of the omitted variables at the household level in our
analyses for three reasons. First, ap r i o r ithere is not likely to be a high degree of correlation
between unobserved household effects and irrigated area. Second, it is possible that, given our
speciﬁcation, we are missing important household-level determinants of income; in particular,
measures of the ability of the household wage earners. To control for this, we add two measures
of ability: the classroom grades of the household head during his/her last year in school; and
the educational attainment of the mother. Although these are not perfect measures, they have
been used in other analyses. When we include these variables, the coefﬁcient on the irrigation
variable does not change substantially (results not shown in the text). Third, as the only part of a
household’s irrigated area that might be related to ability is irrigated land that he/she rents (the
rest is allocated to the household by the village based mostly on demographic factors), we have
also included an alternative measure of irrigated land per capita that includes only irrigated land
allocated from the village to the household, which would make it exogenous. When we run our
regressions with this alternative measure, the results are robust (results not shown in the text).
C   Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005Impact of irrigation in rural China 165
Table 2 Determinants of income (Equation 2: ordinary least squares with ﬁxed effects at the
village level)
Dependent variables (yuan per capita)
1. Total 2. Cropping 3. Off-farm 4. Other
income income income income‡
1. Area of irrigated land 2628.459 3082.936 −28.624 −425.853
per capita (ha) (2.37)∗∗ (6.37)∗∗∗ (0.03) (1.52)
2. Household size (no. household −67.308 −14.222 −69.120 16.034
members) (0.57) (1.26) (0.60) (0.90)
3. Average age of household labour −1.748 −2.853 −13.664 14.769
(year) (0.11) (1.61) (0.90) (3.91)∗∗∗
4. Level of education of 116.139 −7.385 86.184 37.340
household’s labour force (2.60)∗∗∗ (1.09) (2.06)∗∗ (2.51)∗∗
(attainment in years)
5. Degree of land fragmentation −184.540 13.531 −189.853 −8.218
(no. plots per household) (2.96)∗∗∗ (1.62) (3.09)∗∗∗ (0.64)
6. Proportion of good quality land −0.502 0.762 −0.692 −0.572
(%) (0.13) (1.82)∗ (0.19) (0.62)
7. Proportion of land affected by −0.811 −0.954 −0.636 0.779
negative shock (%) (0.19) (2.32)∗∗ (0.15) (0.99)
8. Cultivated land per capita (ha) 502.836 640.016 −134.822 −2.357
(0.89) (1.74)∗ (0.27) (0.01)
9. Non-land agricultural assets −0.123 −0.004 −0.061 −0.058
per capita (yuan) (0.44) (0.21) (0.22) (1.53)
10. Self-business assets per capita 0.036 −0.008 0.036 0.008
(yuan) (0.42) (2.08)∗∗ (0.42) (0.79)
11. Livestock assets per capita 0.351 0.033 0.075 0.244
(yuan) (2.53)∗∗ (1.28) (0.59) (4.10)∗∗∗
12. Non-productive assets 0.077 −0.000 0.071 0.006
per capita (yuan) (2.35)∗∗ (0.20) (2.17)∗∗ (1.18)
14. Constant 2115.979 279.794 2398.542 −562.357
(1.68)∗ (2.33)∗∗ (1.93)∗ (2.61)∗∗∗
R-squared 0.18 0.54 0.18 0.17
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗Signiﬁcant at 10 per cent; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5 per cent; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at
1 per cent. ‡Other income includes livestock income, income from gifts (non-remittances), rental income,
income from subsidies and pensions, income from interest, income from asset sales, net value of commercial
agricultural commodities (e.g., vegetable and fruit), value of crop subsidiaries (e.g., fodders), net value of
processed crop products, and miscellaneous income.
3.2 Regression results
Our regression estimates of the effect of irrigation on income are listed in Table 2. The
goodness of ﬁt measure, R2, is 0.18 for total income and 0.54 for the cropping income
equation. These R2 are sufﬁciently high for analyses that use cross-sectional household
data. In addition, many of the coefﬁcients associated with the control variables are
statistically signiﬁcant and of the expected sign. For example, the level of education of
the household’s labour force positively affects total income. Also, as expected, negative
shockssigniﬁcantlyreducecroppingincomeandcultivatedlandpercapitasigniﬁcantly
increases cropping income.
Most importantly, the results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that irrigated
land area has no effect on cropping income and indicate that the descriptive results are
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Table 3 Comparison of the coefﬁcient on area of irrigated land per capita in various income
determination models
Cropping income Total income
1. OLS with variables on village characteristics 3698.692 (11.51)∗∗∗ 3156.934 (3.78)∗∗∗
2. OLS with ﬁxed effects at county level 3136.509 (6.26)∗∗∗ 2464.258 (2.27)∗∗
3. Censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) 2746.484 (38.11)∗∗∗ 2195.031 (8.39)∗∗∗
OLS, ordinary least squares. Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗Signiﬁcant at 10 per cent; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5
per cent; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1 per cent.
largely consistent with multivariate analysis (Table 2, column 2). Increasing irrigated
land per capita by one hectare will lead to an increase of 3082 yuan in annual cropping
income per capita, holding other household characteristics constant. Interestingly,
unlike many of the studies using aggregate data (e.g., Rosegrant and Evenson 1992;
Jin et al. 2002), when we use plot-level data, we ﬁnd a strong relationship between
irrigation and cropping income.
Results that compare estimates from different estimation methods show that the
signs of most coefﬁcients are close across models, although the magnitudes of coefﬁ-
cients differ somewhat for some variables (Table 3). Most importantly, the coefﬁcients
of the key variable, area of irrigated land per capita, are close for these three models
in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical signiﬁcance. Therefore, our ﬁndings are
robust to our choice of estimating method. Estimation using OLS, however, enables us
to control for unobserved heterogeneity across villages using a ﬁxed-effect framework.
Our multivariate analysis also reveals that, when we hold other factors constant,
irrigation has a positive impact on total household income, mainly through its impact
on cropping income. An additional hectare of irrigated land per capita is associated
with an increase of 2628 yuan in total household income per capita. Thus, an increase
of irrigated land per capita of one standard deviation (0.097 ha) leads to an increase in
household per capita income of 255 yuan, which is about 10 per cent of average
household per capita income. As there is no signiﬁcant effect of irrigation on off-farm
income and other income (column 3 and 4), it can be concluded that the positive
impact that irrigation has on total income per capita comes largely from the impact of
irrigation on cropping income.
4. Irrigation and poverty
The ﬁnding that irrigation has a positive impact on cropping income, coupled with the
structural characteristics of household income, suggests that irrigation may have an
importantroleinpovertyreduction.Croppingincomeaccountsforamuchlargershare
of total income in poorer households than in rich ones. Households in the two poorest
deciles earn almost 60 per cent of their income from cropping activities (Table 4). In
contrast, households in the richest decile earn less than 10 per cent from cropping.
Given such an income structure it is not surprising that the correlation coefﬁcient
between cropping income and total income (0.18) is much lower than that between off-
farm income and total income (0.98). Hence, investment in irrigation, by increasing
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Table 4 Share of cropping income in total income by percentiles of total income











Source: 2000 China National Rural Survey.
cropping income, would increase the total income of poor households and lead to
poverty reduction.
4.1 Methodology
To study more carefully the effects of irrigation on poverty, we use a simulation ap-
proach in order to assess the change in poverty incidence arising from a change in a
speciﬁc factor. To do so, we follow Datt (1998) and Gibson and Rozelle (2003) and use
parameters from a regression analysis of the determinants of total income to create a
simulation framework. More speciﬁcally, the basic model is of (log) income per capita,
yhv, deﬂated by the poverty line, c, a ratio known as the ‘welfare ratio’ (Blackorby and
Donaldson 1984):
ln(yhv/c) = α  + γ  Dhv + Xhvβ  + Pvθ  + Zvδ  + µ 
v + ε 
hv, (3)
where ε 
hv is independently and identically distributed normal random variables with
zero means and constant variance, σ v. Note that, although we use a semilog speciﬁca-
tion in Equation 3, Equations 1 and 3 are in essence the same equation except for the
monotonic transformation of the dependent variable.
Normalising income per capita by the poverty line implies that ln(yhv/c) < 0f o r
poor households and the probability of the hth household being poor can be derived
from:
Prob[ln(yhv/c) < 0] =  [−(α  + γ  Dhv + Xhvβ  + Pvθ  + Zvδ  + µ 
v)/σv]. (4)
We adopt the same approach as in estimating Equation 1 and the ﬁxed effects model
we estimate is:
ln(yhv/c) − ln(yhv/c) = γ  (Dhv − ¯ Dhv) + (Xhv − ¯ Xhv)β  + (ε 
hv − ¯ ε 
hv), (5)
where ln(yhv/c), ¯ Dhv, ¯ Xhv and ¯ ε 
hv are the averages of variables at the village level. After
we obtain consistent estimates of γ   and β  by estimating Equation 5, we then plug
them back into Equation 3:
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Table 5 Estimates of log welfare ratio for rural households (Equation 5: ordinary least squares
with ﬁxed effects at the village level)
Dependent variable:
Log welfare ratio
1. Area of irrigated land per capita (ha) 0.733 (1.77)∗
2. Household size (no. household members) 0.007 (0.29)
3. Average age of household labour (year) −0.001 (0.23)
4. Level of education of household’s labour force 0.061 (4.41)∗∗∗
(attainment in years)
5. Degree of land fragmentation (no. household plots) −0.018 (1.22)
6. Proportion of good quality land (%) 0.001 (1.42)
7. Proportion of land affected by negative shock (%) −0.002 (2.29)∗∗
8. Cultivated land per capita (ha) 0.161 (0.42)
9. Non-land agricultural asset per capita (yuan) −0.000 (0.23)
10. Self-business asset per capita (yuan) 0.000 1.88∗
11. Livestock asset per capita (yuan) 0.000 (3.58)∗∗∗
12. Non-productive asset per capita (yuan) 0.000 (4.14)∗∗∗
14. Constant 0.218 (0.88)
R-squared 0.34
Robust t-statistic in parentheses. ∗Signiﬁcant at 10 per cent; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5 per cent; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at
1 per cent.






where the term in brackets is estimated as one single parameter, ˆ α , the village ﬁxed
effect, and is captured by the coefﬁcients on the village dummy variables.
In the simulation, the probability of the hth household being poor is calculated as:






A weighted average of the household probabilities of being poor gives the predicted




cients differs between Equations 2 and 5 because the dependent variable in Equation 2
is a non-linear (log) transformation of that in Equation 5. Nonetheless, the signs
and statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on most of the explanatory variables
are consistent across Equations 2 and 5 (column 1, Table 2; Table 5). In particu-
lar, the coefﬁcient on our variable of interest, area of irrigated land per capita, is
positive and signiﬁcant. In our calculation, we use the ofﬁcial government poverty line
of 625 yuan/year per capita.
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Table 6 Simulated effect of certain changes on incidence of poverty in rural China in 2000
Poverty incidence
Baseline: Actual values 24.05%
Convert households’ non-irrigated land into irrigated land 22.47%∗ (6.56%)†
Increase the level of education of household labour by one year 22.33%∗∗ (7.15%)
†Percentage change from the predicted baseline values is reported in parentheses. Simulated change of the
amount of irrigated land is considered in isolation of the change of level of education. The model used to
predict poverty is reported in Table 5. ∗Signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.
Using the simulation framework, the positive effects of increasing irrigated land on
poverty reduction are clear (Table 6). According to the results, the incidence of poverty
would fall by 1.6 per cent if all non-irrigated land were converted to irrigated land.
Given China’s rural population, this means that such irrigation investment would
reduce the poverty head count by over 12 million. While increased irrigation can
reduce poverty, our results also show the importance of alternative interventions. For
example, increasing the level of education of the household’s labour force by 1 year
decreases the poverty incidence by 1.7 per cent. With our data, unfortunately, it is
impossible to say which type of investment would be more cost-effective at eliminating
poverty. Because we do not have information on the costs of increasing irrigation and
education, our simulation analysis does not include the cost of new irrigation or the
cost of education.
5. Irrigation and inequality
In addition to its positive impact on the incidence of poverty, given the structure
of income in rural China, it is also possible that increased investment in irrigation
could help lower income inequality. Because cropping income contributes heavily to
the income of poor households, increases in irrigation should have a relatively larger
impact on their income, which makes up the lower tail of the income distribution.
Moreover, the regression results also showed that increases in irrigated land area do
not contribute to higher off-farm incomes (Table 2, column 3), which has been shown
by others to increase rural income inequality (Rozelle 1996; Kung and Lee 2001). In
other words, irrigation might increase total income of households in the lower end
of income distribution, while having a smaller impact on the income of those at the
higher end, resulting overall in a lower inequality of total income.
5.1 Methodology
To analyse the impact of irrigation on inequality, we decompose inequality in three
ways: by sourceofincome(croppingincomefromirrigatedplots,croppingincomefrom
non-irrigatedplots,off-farmincomeandotherincome);bygroupaccordingtoirrigation
access (those with some irrigated land and those without any irrigated land); and by
estimated income ﬂows due to speciﬁc household characteristics (e.g. irrigated land area
percapitaandtheeducationlevelofthehousehold’slabourforce).Ourmethodologyis
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similarinallthreecases.WedecomposetheGinicoefﬁcientfortotalhouseholdincome
as a weighted sum of the inequality levels of incomes from different components, with
the weights being functions of the importance of each component and the correlation
of each component with total income. For example, if the income contributed by
irrigated land accounts for a large share of total income and is itself highly unequally
distributed, it is likely to increase the total income inequality. However, if income from
a component is negatively correlated with total income (i.e., this component is more
concentrated in the hands of poor farmers), then larger shares of that factor might
help equalise total income.
We ﬁrst decompose the total income Gini coefﬁcient by income source. We begin by
noting that if yk is income from source k (e.g., irrigated plots), then total household




yk, k = 1,...,K. (8)
Note the subscripts h and v are suppressed here. Following the method suggested
by Stuart (1954), Pyatt et al. (1980) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), we can write the





where Sk is the share of yk in y0; Gk is the Gini coefﬁcient of yk;a n dRk is the Gini
correlation between yk and the distribution of y0 a n di sd e ﬁ n e da s :
Rk = cov(yk, F(y0))/cov(yk, F(yk)), (10)
where F(y0)a n dF(yk) are the cumulative distributions of total household income and
income from source k, respectively.
If income component j increases by a factor of e, such that yj(e) = (1 + e)yj for all
households, the marginal effect of this percentage change on total income inequality is
∂G0/∂ej = Sj(RjG j − G0) j = 1,2,...,K, (11)
where Sj, Rj, Gj and G0 are measured prior to the marginal income change. Dividing
Equation 11 by G0, we obtain:
(∂G0/∂ej)/G0 = (Sj RjG j)/G0 − Sj j = 1,2,...,K. (12)
The relative effect of a marginal percentage change in source-j income on the Gini
coefﬁcientfortotalincome(elasticityoftotalincomeinequalitywithrespecttoincome
source j) equals the relative contribution of source j to overall income inequality minus
the share of source j in total income.
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Decomposing inequality by income sources, however, does not reﬂect the potential
unequalising effects of irrigation as manifested in income differences between groups
that have different irrigation. There may exist two distinct groups of farmers: those
who have access to irrigation and earn relatively high incomes and those who cannot
gain access to irrigation facilities, perhaps as a result of high cost, and therefore earn
relatively low incomes. In such a situation, irrigation may widen income differences be-
tween these two groups and therefore increase inequality. Thus, following Pyatt (1976),
we divide our sample into an irrigated group and a non-irrigated group according to
their irrigated land holdings and then decompose total income inequality into contri-
butions from the within-group inequality and the between-group inequality. While the
within-group inequality is the level of income inequality within the irrigated group and
within the non-irrigated group, the between-group inequality reﬂects partly the poten-
tially unequalising effect of irrigation. One limitation of this approach is that it does
not separate the effect of irrigation from other factors that might be correlated with
irrigation. For example, the quality of land and irrigation status are likely correlated
as farmers are more likely to adopt irrigation for plots that have better quality.
The limitation of decomposing inequality by group can be overcome by using a
regression-based approach to decompose total income inequality by income ﬂows
attributable to speciﬁc household characteristics. This approach follows the work of
Taylor(1997)andMorduchandSicular(2002).Inthisapproach,theestimatedincome
ﬂows contributed by characteristics, such as, area of irrigated land, level of education
andage,arecalculatedusingtheestimatedparameters(ˆ γ and ˆ β)givenbytheregression
results from Equation 2, and these ﬂows constitute the various components of total
income. By construction, total income is the sum of these ﬂows:
yhv = ˆ γ Dhv + Xhv ˆ β + ˆ αv + ˆ εhv, (13)
where ˆ αv is the estimated village ﬁxed effect that is equivalent to the estimate of the
term, α + Pvθ + Zvδ + µv, in Equation 1. The shares of income ﬂows from the area of




yhv , respectively. The decomposition by income ﬂows uses the same approach as the
decomposition by income sources except that each yk is replaced by estimated income
ﬂows ˆ γ Dhv, Xhv ˆ β,ˆ αv and ˆ εhv.
5.2 Decomposition results
The overall Gini coefﬁcient of per capita income from our sample is 0.541 (Equation 9,
Table 7, row 1). Compared to Gini coefﬁcients of 0.28 in 1983 and 0.42 in 1992 as
calculated by Rozelle (1996), inequality has continued to rise in the 1990s. The Gini
coefﬁcient in rural China, however, is well within the range recorded for rural areas in
other developing countries, albeit, on the high side. For instance, Adams (2001) shows
the Gini coefﬁcient in rural Egypt is 0.532 in 1997.
Decomposing the Gini coefﬁcient by income source shows that irrigation could
help to equalise income (Table 7). Cropping income from irrigated land is most equally
distributed with a Gini coefﬁcient approximately 0.1 to 0.2 points lower than those of
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Table 7 Gini decomposition by income sources
Income sources 1. Sk 2. Gk 3. Rk 4. SkGkRk 5. ∂G0/∂ej 6. (∂G0/∂ej)G0
1. Total income 1 0.5407 1 0.5407
Cropping income
2. From irrigated land 0.1692 0.6121 0.3478 0.0360 −0.0555 −0.1026
3. From non-irrigated 0.0398 0.8433 0.1045 0.0035 −0.0180 −0.0333
land
4. Off-farm income 0.6208 0.7324 0.9070 0.4124 0.0768 0.1420
5. Other income 0.1778 0.7767 0.6452 0.0891 −0.0070 −0.0130
Sk, share of income source k in total income. Gk, Gini coefﬁcient of income source k. Rk, Gini correlation
between income source k and the distribution of total income. SkGkRk, contribution of income source k to
the Gini coefﬁcient of total income. SkGkRk of cropping income, off-farm and other income sum to 0.5407.
∂G0/∂ej, marginal effect on the Gini coefﬁcient of total income due to a marginal percentage increase in
income source j.( ∂G0/∂ej)G0, relative effect of a marginal percentage increase in income source j upon the
Gini coefﬁcient of total income.
other income sources (Table 7, column 2). Cropping income is not concentrated in rich
households as the Gini correlation between cropping income and total income, Rk,i s
0.35, much lower than that for off-farm income. More saliently, cropping income from
irrigated land has the highest marginal effect on lowering inequality (column 6). A
1percentincreaseincroppingincomefromirrigatedlandforallhouseholdswouldde-
creasetheGinicoefﬁcientfortotalincomeby0.1percent.Hence,justasRozelle(1996)
found that cropping income, in general, helped abate regional inequality, our results
indicate that interhousehold inequality is attenuated by the presence of irrigation.
Our results from decomposing inequality by group show that while the income
differences between the irrigated group and non-irrigated group have contributed to
the overall income inequality, the between-group component is not dominant (Table 8,
row 2). Only about 9 per cent of the total inequality level appears to arise from the
presence of barriers to irrigation, reﬂecting the positive but small unequalising effect
of irrigation. In contrast, 77 per cent of total inequality comes from the inequality
within each group (row 2, column 4). The large within-group effect indicates that
there is substantial inequality among farmers that have irrigated plots and among
non-irrigated farmers.
Results from decomposing inequality by income ﬂows as a result of speciﬁc
household characteristics further conﬁrm irrigation’s propensity to equalise income
(Table 9). After controlling for other factors, a 1 per cent increase of irrigated land
per capita leads to a 0.05 per cent decrease in the Gini coefﬁcient for total income.
However, the results also show that irrigation is not the only factor that can decrease
inequality. A 1 per cent increase of the education level of the labour force in a house-
hold will lead to a 0.23 per cent decrease in the inequality level of total income. Hence,
education, like irrigation, can reduce poverty and lower income inequality.
6. Conclusion
In the present paper we explore the relationship between irrigation status, income,
poverty and inequality using a nationally representative data set for rural areas in
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Table 8 Gini decomposition by subgroups (the irrigated group and the non-irrigated group)
1. 2. 3. 4.
Total Gini ratio Between-group† Overlap‡ Within-group§
1. 0.537¶ 0.048 0.077 0.412
2. (100) (8.89)†† (14.31)†† (76.8)††
Share of Share of Gini coefﬁcients
population (%) income (%) by groups
3. Irrigated group 84.81 89.34 0.534
4. Non-irrigated group 15.19 10.66 0.533
5. Total population 100 100
†Between-group refers to inequality arising from income differences between irrigated group and the
non-irrigated group. ‡Overlap refers to inequality arising from the fact the income ranges in different
groups overlap. Some households could be relatively poor in the group with higher average income but rich
in another group. §Within-group refers to inequality arising from income differences among households in
t h es a m eg r o u p .¶Gini coefﬁcient of total population differs slightly from that in Table 7 because we did
not include households without information on irrigation. ††Share of each source of inequality in total
inequality level is in parentheses.
Table 9 Gini decomposition by income ﬂows as a result of speciﬁc household characteristics
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Income sources Sk Gk Rk SkGkRk ∂G0/∂ej (∂G0/∂ej)/G0
1. Total income per capita (yuan) 1 0.5407 1 0.5407 0
2. Area of irrigated land per capita 0.0649 0.5199 0.2122 0.0072 −0.0279 −0.0517
(ha)
3. Level of education of household’s 0.2597 0.2347 0.2567 0.0157 −0.1248 −0.2308
labour force (attainment in years)
4. Proportion of good quality 0.0199 0.2342 0.1155 0.0005 −0.0102 −0.0189
land (%)
5. Cultivated land per capita (ha) 0.0402 0.4676 0.0470 0.0009 −0.0209 −0.0386
This table uses results from Table 2. Not all variables are reported for the sake of brevity. Sk, share of
income ﬂow contributed by factor k in total household income. Column (1) does not sum to one because
we did not list all explanatory variables in the regression or the residual. Gk, Gini coefﬁcient of income
ﬂow contributed by factor k. Rk, Gini correlation between income ﬂow contributed by factor k and the
distributionoftotalincome.SkGkRk,contributionofincomeﬂowcontributedbyfactorktoGinicoefﬁcient
of total income. The sum of the ﬁve (SkGkRk)s do not sum to 0.5572 because we did not list all explanatory
variables in the regression or the residual. ∂G0/∂ej, marginal effect on Gini coefﬁcient of total income
due to a marginal percentage increase in income ﬂow contributed by factor j.( ∂G0/∂ej)G0, relative effect
ofamarginalpercentagechangeinincomeﬂowcontributedbyfactorj uponGinicoefﬁcientoftotalincome.
China. Using descriptive and multivariate analysis, we ﬁnd evidence of the strong
impact of irrigation on income and poverty. Using several alternative decomposition
analyses of inequality, we ﬁnd that irrigation also helps reduce income inequality.
Hence, continued investment in new irrigation projects and maintenance of existing
systems will help to attain the government’s rural welfare improvement goals. More-
over, as reducing poverty and reducing inequality both have growth-enhancing effects
(Deininger and Squire 1998), irrigation investment could have an added beneﬁt. Irri-
gation investment in rural China appears to be an investment that can lead to both
growth and equity.
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While irrigation raises growth and attenuates poverty and inequality, it should not
necessarily be the government’s primary tool for development in all regions. Cost-
beneﬁt analysis is also necessary to justify new irrigation projects. With such a high
share of cultivated area already under irrigation, the cost of installing new irrigation
systems is likely to be high in much of China. In many cases, alternative investments,
such as investment in education, should be considered. One of the implications of our
work, however, is that when evaluating the beneﬁts of irrigation, analysts may want to
giveextraweighttoirrigationprojectsbecauseoftheirpotentialpovertyandinequality
reducing effects. In short, although irrigation has many beneﬁts for development, our
policy recommendation does not mean that irrigation should be increased at any cost;
however, irrigation can lead to higher incomes, lower poverty and reduced inequality
in the areas where it is appropriate.
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